The nonzero sum n-person game has been considered. It is well known that the game can be reduced to a global optimization problem [5; 7; 14]. By extending Mills' result [5], we derive global optimality conditions for a Nash equilibrium. In order to solve the problem numerically, we apply the Curvilinear Multistart Algorithm [2; 3] developed for finding global solutions in nonconvex optimization problems. The proposed algorithm was tested on three and four person games. Also, for the test purpose, we have considered competitions of 3 companies at the bread market of Ulaanbaatar as the three person game and solved numerically.
Introduction
Game theory plays an important role in applied mathematics, mathematical modeling, economics and decision theory. There are many works devoted to game theory [6; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 4] . Most of them deals with zero sum two person games or nonzero sum two person games. Also, two person non zero sum game was studied in [10; 15; 16] by reducing it to D.C programming [1] . The three person game was examined in [2] by global optimization techniques. So far, less attention has been paid to computational aspects of game theory, specially N -person game. Aim of this paper to fulfill this gap. This paper considers nonzero sum n person game. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate non zero sum n person game and show that it can be formulated as a global optimization problem with polynomial constraints. We formulate the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium for non zero sum n-person games as a nonlinear programming problem. A Global search algorithm has been propose in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to computational experiments.
Nonzero Sum n-person Game
Consider the n-person game in mixed strategies with matrices (A q , q = 1, 2, . . . , n) for players 1, 2, . . . , n.
A q = a q i 1 i 2 ...in , q = 1, 2, . . . , n i 1 = 1, 2, . . . , k 1 , . . . , i n = 1, 2, . . . , k n , Denote by D p the set
u i = 1, u i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , p}, p = k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k n A mixed strategy for player 1 is a vector
i represents the probability that player 1 uses a strategy i. Similarly, the mixed strategies for q-th player is x q = (x q 1 , x q 2 , . . . , x q kq ) ∈ D kq , q = 1, 2, . . . , n. Their expected payoffs are given by for 1-th person :
. . .
and for q-th person
It is clear that
Denote by
For further purpose, it is useful to formulate the following statement.
Proof. Necessity : Assume thatx is a Nash equilibrium. Then by the definition, we have
In the inequality 2.2, successively choose x q iq = 1, i q = 1, 2, . . . , k q . We can easily see that f q (x) = ϕ iq (x|x q ), for i q = 1, 2, . . . , k q ; q = 1, 2, . . . , n.
conditions 2.1 are satisfied. We choose x q ∈ D kq , q = 1, 2, . . . , n and multiply 2.1 by x q iq respectively. We obtain
Taking into account that
which shows thatx is a Nash equilibrium. The proof is complete.
Theorem 2. A mixed strategyx is a Nash equilibrium for the nonzero sum n-person game if and only if there exists vectorp ∈ R n such that vector (x,p) is a solution to the following bilinear programming problem :
Proof. Necessity : Now suppose thatx is a Nash point. Choose vector p as :p q = f q (x), q = 1, 2, . . . , n. We show that (x,p) is a solution to problem 2.3-2.4. First, we show that (x,p) is a feasible point for the problem. By theorem 1, the equivalent characterization of a Nash point, we have
The rest of the constraints are satisfied becausex q ∈ D kq , q = 1, 2, . . . , n. It meant that (x,p) is a feasible point. Choose any x q ∈ D kq , q = 1, 2, . . . , n. Multiply 2.4 by x q iq , q = 1, 2, . . . , n. respectively. If we have sum up these inequalities, we obtain
Hence, we get Sufficiency : Now we have to show reverse, namely, that any solution of problem 2.3-2.4 must be a Nash point. Let (x,p) be any solution of problem 2.3-2.4. Letx be a Nash point for the game, and setp q = f q (x). We will show thatx must be a Nash equilibrium of the game. Since (x,p) is a feasible point, we have
Hence, we have f q (x) ≤p q , q = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Adding these inequalities, we obtain
We know that at a Nash equilibrium F (x,p) = 0. Since (x,p) is also a solution, F (x,p) be equal to zero :
Consequently, f q (x) =p q , q = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Since a point (x,p) feasible, we can write the constraints (2.5) as follows :
Now taking into account the above results, by theorem 1 we conclude thatx is a Nash point which a completes the proof.
The Curvilinear Multistart Algorithm
In order to solve considered problems, we use curvilinear multistart algorithm. The algorithm was originally developed for solving box-constrained optimization problems, therefore, we convert our problem from the constrained to unconstrained form using penalty function techniques. For each equality constraint g(x) = 0, we construct a simple penalty functionĝ(x) = g 2 (x). For each inequality constraint q(x) ≤ 0, we also construct the corresponding penalty function as follows:
Thus, we have the following box-constrained optimization problem:
where γ is a penalty parameter, x and x -are lower and upper bounds.
For original x-variables the constraint is the box [0, 1]; for p-variables box constraints are [0, p q ]. Values of p q are chosen from some intervals. An initial value of a penalty parameter γ is chosen not too large (something about 1000) and after finding some local minimums we increase it for searching another local minimum. The proposed algorithm starts from some initial point x 1 ∈ X. At each k−th iteration the algorithm performs randomly "drop" of two auxiliary pointsx 1 andx 2 and generating a curve (parabola) which passes through all three points x k ,x 1 andx 2 . Then we generate some random grid along this curve and try to found all convex triples inside the grid. For each founded triple we perform refining the triple minima value with using golden section method. The best triple became a start point for local optimization algorithm, the final point of which will be a start point for the next iteration of global method. Details are presented in Algorithms 1 and 2.
Computational Experiments
The proposed method was implemented in C language and tested on compatibility with using the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC, versions 
Algorithm 1 The Curvilinear Multistart Algorithm
Input: x 1 ∈ X -initial (start) point; K > 0 -iterations count; δ > 0; N > 0; ε α > 0 -algorithm parameters. Output: Global minimum point x * and
generate stochastic pointx 1 ∈ X
3:
generate stochastic pointx 2 ∈ X
4:
generate stochastic α-grid:
α k * ← 0 8:
Refining the value of minima using //Golden-Section search method with accuracy ε α 10:
end if 15: end if 16: end for //Start local optimization algorithm 17:
The proposed algorithm was applied for numerically solving number of problems with 3 and 4 players. In all cases, Nash equilibrium points were found successfully. Problems 3.1-3.3 are of type (2.3)−(??) have been solved numerically for dimensions 2 × 2 × 2.
Algorithm 2 The Local Optimization Algorithm
Input: x 1 ∈ X -initial (start) point; ε x > 0 -accuracy parameter. Output: Local minimum point x * and f * = f (x * ) 1: repeat 2:
//Perform local relaxation step, for example, with using standard convex interval capture technique.
3:
The optimization problem is : Also, we found 4 Nash equilibrium points are:
points It means that first and second companies must follow their 5-th and 6-th production strategies while third company applies for its 1-st production strategy. Companies's maximum profits were 65, 160 and 53 respectively. 
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